Court dismisses motion to set aside $1.75M ‘groomer’ defamation judgment

Case Summary

CATIE et al v. Blackwell, Endorsement of MacLeod RSJ (June 26, 2026)

On June 26, 2026, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed a motion to set aside a $1.75 million default judgment ordered against an online publisher who engaged in a torrent of libels falsely smearing the staff and volunteer directors of a sexual health non-profit organization as “groomers”, pedophiles, and criminals.

Background

The default judgment, rendered by McVey J in August 2025 and cited as CATIE et al v. Blackwell, 2025 ONSC 4678 (summary here), found that the defendant, Peter Scott Blackwell, had published defamatory online profiles of members of the board and staff of the Canadian AIDS Treatment Information Exchange (CATIE), using each individual plaintiff's photograph and the organization's logo. He then took steps to promote and re-post the profiles repeatedly, using various social media accounts associated with his website. Several of the individual plaintiffs were 2SLGBTQI-identifying, a community which is closely related to CATIE’s work.

When he was served with notice of libel in October 2023, the defendant assaulted the process server. He then escalated his online abuse and threats. Her Honour’s reasons included a finding that Blackwell had “left two derogatory, expletive-filled voicemail messages at CATIE’s office, threatening to publish additional defamatory content about 'every single last one' of CATIE’s staff, including the receptionist”. McVey J concluded that “the defendant’s actions were malicious, sustained, and fuelled by hate” and found that “the impugned posts and individual profiles […] were demeaning and defamatory”, which was “self-evident and required minimal further discussion.”

The default judgment motion followed exhaustive efforts by the plaintiffs to serve their claim on the defendant, who took steps to evade service. Efforts were made to serve the claim by email, mail, and text message to published points of contact for the defendant, through intermediaries, as well as through targeted social media ads on Facebook and Instagram to bring the claim to the attention of the defendant. Service was validated by court order in January 2025.

Immediately following the release of the default judgment decision, Blackwell again escalated his online abuse and defamation, this time targeting the plaintiffs’ counsel with well over 100 defamatory posts, similar to those deployed against their clients. The firm and its named partners obtained a permanent injunction against Blackwell in November 2025. That decision, rendered by Newton RSJ, is cited as Judson Howie LLP et al v. Blackwell, 2025 ONSC 6689 (summary here).

The Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment

In September 2025, the plaintiffs sought to examine Blackwell in aid of execution of their judgment. Blackwell attended the examination in the company of Pat King, one of the organizers of the 2022 Ottawa ‘Convoy’. He refused to swear or affirm to tell the truth. This prompted the plaintiffs to bring a motion to compel his attendance and seeking contempt remedies should he fail to cooperate.

Perron AJ (as she then was) directed that this motion be brought on notice to the defendant. In January 2026, only once faced with the prospect of findings of contempt did the defendant begin taking steps to set aside the default judgment. Her Honour directed that the motion to set aside the default judgment be heard prior to the plaintiffs’ motion to compel his attendance for examination.

The motions were heard together by MacLeod RSJ on June 25, 2026. In an endorsement issued the following day, His Honour concluded that the defendant “does not come close” to meeting the test under rule 19.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as set out by the Court of Appeal in Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen, 2014 ONCA 194. That test requires the court to consider:

• whether the motion was brought promptly after the defendant learned of the default judgment;

• whether there is a plausible excuse or explanation for the defendant's default;

• whether the facts establish that the defendant has an arguable defence on the merits;

• the potential prejudice to the defendant should the motion be dismissed, and the potential prejudice to the plaintiff should the motion be allowed; and

• the effect of any order the motion judge may make on the overall integrity of the administration of justice.

His Honour found that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant had long been aware of the action against him and had deliberately avoided service – pointing to the findings of Corthorn J and McVey J in previous motions before the court. While not mentioned in the endorsement, appellate authorities are clear that intentional or conscious defaults are not a basis to set aside a judgment (see Sunlife Assurance Company of Canada v. Premier Financial Group Incorporated (Premier Financial), 2013 ONCA 151).

His Honour also agreed with the plaintiffs that the defendant had disclosed no arguable defence in his materials. The affidavit evidence provided had confirmed (i) that Blackwell was the publisher of the impugned content and (ii) that he acknowledged it was about the plaintiffs – satisfying two of the three elements of the tort of defamation, under Grant v. TorStar, 2009 SCC 61. On the third element – the question of whether the posts were defamatory, in the sense that they would tend to lower the plaintiffs’ reputation – the plaintiffs relied on McVey J’s explicit findings that the defamatory nature of the publications was “self-evident” as well as the established jurisprudence highlighting that falsely labelling someone as a sexual predator or “groomer” targeting children was defamatory (see, for example, Bagwalla v. Ronin et al, 2017 ONSC 6693 (Div. Ct.)).

While no recognized defamation defences were named by the defendant in his motion material, even if the court were to have presumed that a defence of fair comment was asserted, the plaintiffs relied on the court’s recent decision in Rainbow Alliance Dryden v. Webster, 2025 ONSC 1161 (summary here). In that decision, Pierce J accepted the submission of Egale Canada “that falsely labelling 2SLGBTQI individuals as groomers cannot be a fair comment because perpetuating harmful myths and stereotypes about vulnerable members of society is not a matter of public interest”. This defeats the public interest requirement for fair comment – in addition to the defendant’s failure to address the apparent malice underlying his retaliatory publishing and threatening voicemail messages. Expression actuated by malice is not protected as fair comment. MacLeod RSJ's endorsement acknowledged that the defendant had demonstrated a "pattern of escalating the torrent of abusive and defamatory communication in response to steps taken by the plaintiff".

While Blackwell claimed to have disabilities which prevented him from participating in the litigation in a timely manner, MacLeod RSJ found that on Blackwell's own evidence, he understood the nature of the litigation and had received the plaintiffs’ claim. The plaintiffs had entered evidence showing that the defendant’s own libelous publications admitted having received the plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim and that he actively took steps to refuse mail addressed to him from the plaintiffs’ counsel. Evidence from a process server confirmed that Blackwell had lied about his identity on at least one occasion when confronted for service. Notably, faced with similar submissions in November 2025, Newton RSJ found that Blackwell “demonstrate[d] an understanding of the legal process, the issues, and the ability to put his position before the court.”

Outcome

Blackwell’s motion was dismissed and he was ordered to pay the plaintiffs a further $9,500 in costs. This is in addition to the $1.75 million judgment from August 2025, and the existing $23,000 costs award, which continues to attract interest. Blackwell was also ordered to attend an examination in aid of execution and to produce documents requested by the plaintiffs.

This motion decision – while brief – confirms that defendants cannot deliberately evade service, ignore litigation, and later seek to reopen judgments without a reasonable explanation or an arguable defence that raises a genuine issue for trial.

The judgment against Blackwell stands as one of the largest defamation judgments in Canada. The decision represents Judson Howie LLP's sixth legal victory against persons who have targeted members of the 2SLGBTQI community with false "groomer" allegations.

The successful plaintiffs were represented by Douglas W. Judson of Judson Howie LLP.

For more information, please contact:

Douglas W. Judson (he/him)

Judson Howie LLP

Email: doug@judsonhowie.ca